



Unreliable Partners In The Search For Peace In Darfur
A Profile of the Sudanese Regime

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UNRELIABLE PARTNERS IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE:

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Executive Summary and headlines

It is too early to celebrate the recent agreement between the Government of Sudan (the G.o.S.) and some of Darfur's rebel groups. Khartoum has bowed to enormous pressure from foreign diplomats and politicians, especially the British and Americans, and it has signed a peace deal. However, there are several reasons to be cautious:

- 1) The mainly Arab Janjaweed militia continues to attack, kill and rape civilians. Several serious incidents have been reported since the peace agreement was signed in Abuja, Nigeria in May. Observers such as the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch and the United Nations are in no doubt that Khartoum arms, enables and directs the Janjaweed.
- 2) The G.o.S. refuses to commit itself to allowing a United Nations peacekeeping force into Darfur. Strangely, Hilary Benn, the Secretary of State for International Development, recently told the House of Commons that it is "understood" that Khartoum will give the UN access. However there are daily statements to the contrary from the Sudanese regime, denying that it will permit a UN presence, except on its explicit terms. Those terms preclude the UN having what is known as a Chapter 7 mandate (the authority to protect civilians and disarm those who are killing and attacking civilians). Without a Chapter 7 mandate, most observers believe a UN force will have little effect on the ongoing bloodshed.
- 3) Some rebels refused to sign the agreement, preferring an 'understanding' to abide by its terms instead. Apparently they are not convinced Khartoum will allow Darfur sufficient representation within the national government, nor any meaningful influence over the allocation of Sudan's annual \$11 billion of oil revenues, nor genuine disarmament of Khartoum's proxies, the Janjaweed militias. They point to the faltering Comprehensive Peace Agreement (C.P.A.), the peace deal between Khartoum and southern Sudanese rebels, signed in January 2005. Kofi Annan, amongst others, has determined that Khartoum has not abided by several important aspects of the C.P.A.

As the Nigerian leader, Olusegun Obasanjo, said of the Darfur peace deal, "Unless the right attitude and the right disposition is there, this document is not worth the paper it is signed on."

This briefing will examine Khartoum's recent track record: its fundamentalist, Islamist policies; its broken promises to concerned international representatives including Tony Blair and Kofi Annan; the treaties it has signed and disregarded; and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the southern Sudan rebels, which Khartoum continues to disregard with potentially deadly consequences.

Background

Sadly, for the people of Darfur, the ongoing genocide in their homeland receives patchy media attention. In the past two and a half years the remote and arid region of western Sudan has been ravaged by wave after wave of attack by the mainly Arab Janjaweed militia, supported by the full might of the armed forces of Sudan. Local rebels who are fighting Khartoum's long-standing indifference to Darfur have also compromised the delivery of humanitarian aid, calling into question the ability of the international community to sustain its much-needed assistance to the people of Darfur.

The United Nations eventually registered the continuing scenes of horror in Darfur and passed several resolutions aimed at reigning in the militias and encouraging the government of Sudan to cease actively supporting and enabling the Janjaweed. The UN's resolutions have yet to be enforced, despite the conclusion of the UN's International Commission of Inquiry (ICI): in Darfur there is mass killing and mass displacement.

So far there are thought to be between 300,000 and 450,000 dead. Another 2.5 million have been affected by the conflict, the majority made homeless when the villages have been destroyed. This displacement has subsequently introduced neighboring Chad into the conflict.¹ All the evidence we have received from our contacts in Chad and Darfur leads us to believe this conflict is spinning out of control, threatening the already unstable government of Chad.

This is almost a carbon copy of how the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo was dragged into the Rwandan genocide in 1994, when hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled over the border (resulting in the deaths of over a million people in Eastern Congo, due to conflict and instability).

The African Union currently has a 7,000-strong monitoring mission covering an area the size of France with very few roads. Despite the AU's best efforts the UN has finally acknowledged that a UN peacekeeping force is necessary to protect the vulnerable civilian population. The proposed mission will not be ready until the start of 2007. The government of Sudan has repeatedly warned that a UN mission will not be allowed into Darfur unless it gives its explicit approval, within the context of a Darfur peace deal. Specifically, it must not have Chapter 7 powers. Khartoum has also hinted on several occasions, with the vocal support of its old friend Osama bin Laden, that a jihad will be unleashed against any intervening force.

¹ A senior Chadian army commander, General Abakar Itno, was killed recently fighting rebels on the Chad/Sudan border. It is suspected the Chadian rebel group is supported by the Janjaweed militia. Clear evidence that the situation is worsening

The Search For A Peace Deal

The United Kingdom leads the world in the generosity of its humanitarian response to the genocide in Darfur. However, Waging Peace has been concerned from the beginning of our involvement in Sudan, that characterizing events in Darfur as a humanitarian disaster will handicap the search for a lasting peace. The deliberate ethnic cleansing and destruction of 90% of black African villages is not akin to a natural disaster like an earthquake: it is genocide. By arming and supporting the Janjaweed, the ruling junta in Khartoum has deliberately provoked a civil war. Khartoum is not a helpless bystander, but the architect and enabler of the forces devastating Darfur.

A recent study by Danish academics (Petersen & Tullin, April 2006) shows the Janjaweed militia and the Government of Sudan's armed forces are responsible for 97% of the killing in Darfur. The rebel groups account for the remaining three per cent. It is therefore unhelpful for British politicians and diplomats to imply that the rebels are equally responsible as the G.o.S and its Janjaweed proxies for the genocide.

The purpose of this briefing is to illustrate that the international community, and Great Britain in particular, is mistaken if it believes that those in charge of the totalitarian dictatorship in Khartoum are sincere in their desire to secure a lasting and just peace in Darfur. Unless sustained and serious pressure is brought to bear on those ruling Sudan, including sanctions that personally affect the architects of the genocide, they have no reason to seek a meaningful resolution to Darfur's problems.

The attitude of the British government towards the genocide in Darfur is epitomized by Jack Straw's comments that, 'The only solution for the problems of Darfur is a political settlement'.²

While diplomacy must be used to secure a genuine peace deal, the Foreign Office assumption that the G.o.S. genuinely wants to implement a political settlement and stop the genocide in Darfur, is in doubt. This briefing examines the nature and reputation of the G.o.S., noting its track record, in addition to evidence from relevant international organisations, NGOs, state departments and the Khartoum regime itself.

We conclude, as have many independent analysts, that the G.o.S. is one of the key abusers to its own sovereignty, and has been since it seized power in a coup in 1989. It is also clear that the G.o.S. is actually instigating the genocide in Darfur, just as the late Slobodan Milosevic designed the 'Greater Serbia' project that devastated the Balkans in the 1990s.

The consequences of these findings suggest that a political solution will not be respected or enforced by the Khartoum regime because it has no rational reason to cooperate. The United Kingdom's politicians and diplomats are mistaken in thinking their opposite numbers in Khartoum are concerned with the welfare of their citizens, or with developing their country. The prime movers in Khartoum have had ample

²<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1138872187440>

opportunity to use their vast oil revenues (\$11 billion a year) to deliver clean water and electricity to their citizens, to build schools, hospitals and roads, and they have chosen not to. Since the junta is not accountable to either a free press or to an electorate through free and fair elections, it is not obliged to address matters of peace and development.

The regime has used whatever ends necessary, including violence, torture and intimidation, to maintain the centre of authority in Khartoum. Its prime goal, like all totalitarian regimes, is self-preservation. In addition, its members remain bound together by their deeply rooted ideology, fundamentalist Islamism, as well as sharing in the material benefits of their profoundly corrupt regime.

This is not conjecture: during the long, drawn-out Naivasha negotiations to end three decades of conflict between Khartoum and southern Sudan, a pattern emerged. Actions that appeared to the international community to be irrational were in fact carefully calculated to draw in the SPLA (Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army) and to make them impotent and without options.

Representatives of western governments were then, and are now, mistaken or disingenuous when they project onto the Khartoum regime the same concerns for their own citizens that inform the way in which our elected officials try to serve their voters. A total disregard for the welfare and liberties of its citizens, undermining its own sovereignty, suggests that Khartoum will not respond to gentlemanly political pressure without the supportive strength of sanctions and an internationally backed intervention.

Human Rights Abuses

The present Khartoum regime is headed by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir who gained power in 1989 by coup. From the beginning human rights have been abused in numerous ways to maintain power.³ International monitors, from Amnesty International to Human Rights Watch (HRW), have slammed Sudan for its poor record.

In April 2006 the Ethical Consumer group concluded that Sudan was the most repressive regime in the world today. Ethical Consumer collated and tabulated all available information from HRW, Amnesty, Transparency International, War on Want, Survival International, Unicef and various UN agencies, according to the following criteria: freedom of speech, freedom of association, the ability to vote in free and fair elections, the use of torture and detention of civil society leaders by the state, imprisonment and disappearances of human rights activists, and the right of workers to join unions. They ranked Sudan as by far the world's most repressive regime, well ahead of China, Burma, Libya, Pakistan, and Syria.

³ Authors note - Examples of human rights abuses will be listed in this section, however the genocidal killings taking place in Darfur will be omitted since they are mentioned separately.

Free speech and self-determination is repressed. For example, in April 2003 150 notables from Darfur presented a petition to President al-Bashir, asking for political negotiations with rebels, a ceasefire, the freeing of political prisoners and the facilitation of humanitarian aid. The G.o.S.'s response was to declare a state of emergency and increase political arrests of 'Darfur sympathisers'.⁴

Torture of detainees by the security forces, military intelligence and police is widespread, particularly in Darfur. For instance, Amnesty International claim that twelve people from Mellit, North Darfur state, were arrested by the Positive Security in August and tortured to make them confess to fabricating a video tape showing rapes. Four women were beaten with a belt, kicked and punched. Mariam Mohamed Dinar had her nails pulled out with pincers. Men arrested at the same time were also reportedly tortured. The charges were dropped and all were released in November.⁵ This is just one example of what is a persistent pattern. For more information, see the Sudan Organisation Against Torture website (www.soatsudan.org).

The UN's International Commission of Inquiry (ICI) to Darfur cites Sudan's National Security and Intelligence Service and its Military Intelligence as systematically using torture on detainees. 'Most of them were repeatedly beaten, whipped, slapped and, in one case, kept under the scorching sun for four days. Three of the persons were suspended from the ceiling and beaten, one of them continuously for ten days'.⁶

The use of torture by the state is not only strictly prohibited by the Geneva Convention but also by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, all of which Sudan has signed.

Further Reading: Prunier Gerard, 'Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide', C. Hurst & Co, 2005.
UN ICI Darfur Report-
http://www.aegitrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=242&Itemid=240
Amnesty International Report 2005 entry on Sudan-
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=9771

Abuse Concerning Women

Rape is a weapon used continuously against black African women in Darfur. A sustained campaign of rape has been perpetrated by both the Janjaweed and Sudanese Government troops and police. Thousands of women have been raped during attacks and are frequently abducted into sexual slavery for days or months. The sustained pattern of the rape makes it part of the overall campaign of genocide.

In a traditional society such as Darfur, rape does not just affect the physical and mental health of the individuals involved, but also their status among their own community. It should be noted that rape is not just a crime against humanity but can contribute to genocide under Article 2.2 of the Convention on the Prevention and

⁴ Prunier Gérard, 2005, 96.

⁶ http://www.aegitrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=242&Itemid=240, pt. 369

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The importance of this point cannot be neglected in light of the systemic, targeted nature of the proliferation of rape in Darfur.

The UN's ICI reports three patterns of rape. First, deliberate aggression against women and girls, including gang rapes, occur during the attacks on villages. Second, women and girls are abducted, held in confinement for several days and repeatedly raped. Third, rape and other forms of sexual violence continue during flight, further displacement and everyday life, often when women leave towns and IDP sites to collect wood or water.

The IDR noted that 16% of all people interviewed had witnessed or had been subjected to rape by either the Janjaweed and Government forces. In just one example of many, 45 women were taken from the village Mukjar by Government soldiers and militiamen and were raped. One was raped by six men and given to a soldier who kept her in sexual slavery for one month in Nyala and then took her to Khartoum, where she remained for two months before escaping.

The ICI concluded that rape and other forms of sexual violence were conducted mainly against three black African tribes, indicating the discriminatory intent of the perpetrators and their supporters.⁷ Rape is being used as a racist tool in Darfur, just as it was in the Balkans.

In Darfur the Sudanese authorities initially denied rape was happening on a wide scale. They systematically imprisoned women claiming to have been raped, accusing them of adultery. On one of the rare occasions when the international community complained to Khartoum, this practice was dropped. The pace and scale of rapes continues, however.

Further Reading: The UN ICI Darfur Report.

Africa rights, *'facing genocide: the Nuba of Sudan'*, 1995

Slavery

The G.o.S. claims that slavery is a matter of rival tribes engaging in hostage taking, over which it had little control. Despite the G.o.S. being a party to several international anti-slavery treaties⁸, there is no prohibition in the Sudan Criminal Code of 1991 against slavery. Nor have any successful prosecutions against slave traders been brought in Sudanese courts.

Human Rights Watch believes the G.o.S. backs and arms militiamen of the Baggara tribes involved in slavery. The militia raid villages to capture children and women who are then held in conditions of slavery in western Sudan and elsewhere. They are forced to work for free in homes and in fields, punished when they refuse, and abused physically and sexually. Raids are directed mostly at the civilian Dinka

⁷ http://www.aegitrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=242&Itemid=240, pt. 360

⁸ Such as the Slavery Convention, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

population of the southern region of Bahr El Ghazal. The government thus enables and sanctions the practice of slavery by this tribal militia, known as muraheleen.

Khartoum is responsible not only of knowingly arming, transporting and assisting the slave-raiding militia; it also is responsible for not enforcing its own laws against kidnapping, assault, and forced labour.⁹

Further Reading: Human Rights Watch, '*Slavery and Slave Redemption in the Sudan*', <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudanupdate.htm>

Human Rights Watch - '*Children of Sudan - Slaves, street children and child soldiers*', 1995. (paperback)

UN ICI Darfur Report

Khartoum's Genocidal Intent and Actions in Darfur

Impartial human rights and humanitarian groups such as the International Crisis Group, Christian Aid and Human Rights Watch have concluded that Khartoum has instigated violence in Darfur using government troops and the Janjaweed militias. The governments of Canada, Germany and the USA have all determined that this makes Khartoum responsible for genocide in Darfur.

The Janjaweed are recognised as being the main actors responsible for the sustained campaign of ethnic cleansing, rape and murder in Darfur. The G.o.S. formally denies having links with the Janjaweed, whom Khartoum describes as 'armed bandits' or 'uncontrolled elements'. President al Bashir pledged on 19th June 2004 to 'disarm the Janjaweed'.¹⁰ He made the same promise in person to Tony Blair when the British Prime Minister visited Khartoum in October 2004.

However, in December 2003 President Bashir said, 'Our priority from now on is to eliminate the rebellion...we will use the army, the police, the mujahedeen, the horsemen (Janjaweed) to get rid of the rebellion'.

On 24 April 2004, Sudan's Foreign Minister stated: 'The government may have turned a blind eye toward the militias.....this is true, because those militias are targeting the rebellion'.

The ICI concludes that the G.o.S. arms the Janjaweed and, 'The Commission is confident that the large majority of attacks on villages conducted by the militia have been undertaken with the acquiescence of state officials'. HRW and the ICG have both devoted several reports to cataloguing the paper trail between Khartoum and the Janjaweed, including instructions, payment, ammunition supplies and coordination of attacks.

⁹ <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudanupdate.htm>

¹⁰ http://www.aegistrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=242&Itemid=240, pt. 119.

As the ICI concludes, ‘Government officials may incur criminal responsibility for joint criminal enterprise to engage in indiscriminate attacks against civilians and murder of civilians’.¹¹

According to Nicholas Kristof, writing in the New York Review of Books (Feb 9 2006), following five visits to Darfur, “Today the Janjaweed and the Sudanese army work hand in hand as they have in the past.”

The G.o.S.’s armed forces are used – according to Khartoum – for counterinsurgency tactics in Darfur. However the US Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (DRL) interviewed 1,136 randomly picked refugees that had fled over the Chad border.¹² These accounts reinforce other credible sources, indicating that there is a recurrent and recognisable pattern to the attacks on villages and settlements. These sometimes involve aerial attacks by helicopter gunships or fixed-wing aircraft (Russian-supplied Antonov and MIG), including bombing and strafing with automatic weapons before government troops and Janjaweed forces advance on the village.¹³

The Antonov is not a bomber, but a transport plane unsuited for counter-insurgency operations. It is without bomb bays or aiming mechanisms. However the ‘bombs’ described by witnesses are metal and explosives dropped in an oil drum, having the effect of a cluster bomb on impact.¹⁴ One of countless examples is the bombing of Habila town in West Darfur in August 2003. An Antonov aircraft dropped six bombs on the town and the market, resulting in the deaths of 30 civilians. Evidently the G.o.S. air force works in conjunction with the Janjaweed with the aim of maximising civilian deaths.

According to testimony taken by several different international organisations and journalists who have interview witnesses, government troops typically attack with the Janjaweed or encircle the target whilst the Janjaweed advance alone. Thus government troops are implicated in mass killings of their own civilians who belong to mainly the Fur, Massalit, Zaghawa peoples (all black African tribes). Consequently 90% of black African villages in Darfur have been destroyed. The racist natural of these co-ordinated attacks has prompted various observers and governments to label the GoS as complicit in actions of genocide.

In their profile of Musa Hilal, the leader of the Janjaweed, Julie Flint and Alex de Waal (Darfur: A Short History of a Long War), reveal that his hostility to non-Arab tribes is long standing. In 1988 Hilal expressed gratitude for “the necessary weapons and ammunition to exterminate the African tribes in Darfur.”

In the 1990s an earlier version of the Janjaweed was operating in Darfur, with the assistance of Khartoum, carrying out attacks and ethnic cleansing. As Nicholas Kristof comments,

¹¹ http://www.aegitrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=242&Itemid=240 pt. 124 & 125.

¹² <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm>

¹³ http://www.aegitrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=242&Itemid=240, pt. 186

¹⁴ Prunier Gérard, 2005, pg. 96.

“The Sudanese leadership therefore decided to adopt the same strategy it had successfully employed elsewhere in Sudan, using irregular militias to slaughter tribes that had shown resistance.”

Gerard Prunier (*Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*), concludes,

“The whole of Government of Sudan policy and political philosophy since it came to power in 1989 has kept verging on genocide in its general treatment on the national question in Sudan.”

Flint and de Waal describe this tactic as “counterinsurgency on the cheap.”

“In Bahr el Ghazal in 1986-88, in the Nuba Mountains in 1992-95, in Upper Nile in 1998-2003, and elsewhere on just a slightly smaller scale, militias supported by military intelligence and aerial bombardment attacked with unremitting brutality. Scorched earth, massacre, pillage and rape were the norm.”

Musa Hilal and the Janjaweed were supplied with Arab criminals, released from prison for his use by the Sudanese regime. Khartoum then set up training camps, and provided vehicles, uniforms, ammunition and weapons, and paid all recruits generously. Gerard Prunier writes,

“The Janjaweed were accompanied by soldiers. They attacked the people, saying, ‘You are opponents to the regime, we must crush you. As you are black, you are like slaves. Then the entire Darfur region will be in the hands of the Arabs. The Government is on our side. The Government plane is on our side, it gives us food and ammunition.’”

However, Sudan’s Minister of Defence counters that the government are exempt of murder in ‘rebel’ villages because if a rebel is present ‘it is no longer a civilian locality, it becomes a military target.’

Apparently this justifies an estimated 300,000-450,000 deaths. **The UN’s ICI report concludes that the ‘numerous murders of civilians not taking part in the hostilities were committed both by the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed’.**¹⁵

Further Reading: Prunier Gerard, *‘Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide’*, 2005.

UN ICI Darfur Report

DRL ‘*Documenting Atrocities on Darfur*’ <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm>

Prospects for a political settlement

When a government is responsible for or condones human rights abuses, the large-scale internal displacement, genocide, and abduction of its own citizens, it violates its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations requiring Member States to

¹⁵ http://www.aegitrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=242&Itemid=240

"promote universal respect for and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all" (Articles 55 and 56).

It is highly improbable that a state that abuses its sovereignty to such an extent will suddenly become concerned for the welfare of its long-suffering citizens. It is therefore imperative that a lasting and just political solution be enforced with an internationally backed intervention with a strong mandate. There has been consistent resistance to UN intervention from Security Council members such as China and Russia who site Sudan's sovereignty over its own territory (rather than their own intimate and lucrative trade relationships with Khartoum). However The Responsibility To Protect doctrine, adopted in September 2005 by the UN, must now take precedence.

The failure of the Arusha peace accords produced the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. That political settlement could have succeeded in conjunction with a carefully planned, well implemented international intervention; so too could Sudan.

Nicholas Kristof concludes: "Sudan's leaders will brazenly lie about their repressive use of power, and you will get nowhere in dealings with them unless you apply heavy pressure – and you have to be perceptive about what kind of pressure." In analysing what eventually brought about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the south he continues, "They are ruthless opportunists, and they adopted a strategy of genocide because it seemed to be the simplest method available. If the US and the UN raise the cost of genocide, they will adopt an alternative response, such as negotiating a peace settlement. Indeed, whenever the international community has mustered some outrage about Darfur, then the level of killings and rapes subsides."

The 1948 Genocide Convention defines genocide as:

"Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such."

Events in Darfur clearly correspond with this description.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

It is instructive to look at the success of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005, after immense diplomatic pressure from the British and Americans, in particular. The C.P.A. between Khartoum and the southern Sudan rebels, followed more than two decades of death and destruction that claimed two million lives.

The Islamist regime in Khartoum fought a proxy war against the southern Sudanese, many of whom are Christian. They also imposed Sharia law on local Christian communities, and took all of the vast revenues (\$11 billion a year) from the oil deposits, 90% of which are in the south of Sudan.

One important aspect of the C.P.A. was the promise to give the south 50% of the nation's oil revenues. However, despite assurances to the contrary, Khartoum has clung on to the all-important economic ministries in the 'Government of National

Unity'. So far southern Sudan has seen only \$60 million from the vast \$11 billion in revenues.

Khartoum also maintains an iron grip on the Interior Ministry, meaning that there is still no freedom of expression or association or movement, and Sudan still tops the league table for human rights abuses and repression. Sharia law is also still imposed, although disingenuous voices within the UK government try to convince innocent UK journalists that the National Islamic Front regime is less fundamentalist, since the departure from the G.o.S. of the arch ideologue, Hassan Turabi.

One key aspect of the C.P.A. was a commitment by the G.o.S. that its troops leave certain areas of the south, and that Khartoum should stop supplying its proxy militias with arms. Khartoum has failed on both counts. The Civilian Protection Monitoring Team reported that between March and June 2005, the G.o.S. transported and distributed large stocks of ammunition to the Lou Nuer communities along the Sobat River, and incited them to violence and looting against others in the region.

Equally disturbing, 48,000 G.o.S. troops remain in Juba, the southern capital, expressly against the terms of the C.P.A.

When Kofi Annan reported on the C.P.A. to the UN Security Council in September 2005, he concluded that the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum was in violation of the agreement.

A Parting Thought:

The United Nations warns that if the war in Darfur escalates, further denying access for humanitarian relief, the death toll will reach 100,000 a month.

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