



Darfur Update

Genocide Without Borders

December 2006



Waging Peace
Building a safe and democratic world



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Waging Peace campaigns against British support for dictators. Where there is currently inadequate pressure on specific countries, we lobby decision-makers to change diplomatic and corporate relationships with unsavoury regimes.

By propping up repressive rulers we unwittingly encourage the terrorism that now threatens us. We cannot lecture others on democracy, accountability and transparency, while pandering to vicious dictators.

Waging Peace has been campaigning on Darfur since 2004, pressing the British government to recognise genocide has occurred there, to stop pandering to the Khartoum junta, and to start protecting the survivors.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Louise Roland-Gosselin

In the nine months since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and Minawi's faction of the SLA, the situation in Darfur has dramatically deteriorated. The Government of Sudan and its *Janjaweed* proxy have indeed intensified their military offensive against Black African groups in Darfur, leading to further death and displacement amongst innocent civilians.

Eager to maintain economic and political ties with Khartoum, EU, UN and Arab League member states have lacked the political will to confront the Government of Sudan and put an end to human rights atrocities in Darfur. As a result, diplomats have recently given into Khartoum's threats and abandon plans to send UN peacekeepers to Darfur. It now seems likely that the UN's role in Darfur will be limited to financial and material assistance to the existing AU mission in Sudan.

More than ever, the fate of Darfuris relies on the willingness of the international community to take up its responsibility to protect civilians from crimes against humanity and genocide.

Waging Peace calls for:

1) The UN, EU, AU and Arab League to reconstitute a viable and inclusive peace process addressing the root causes of the conflict in Darfur. In order to do so they must allow effective dialogue with non-signatories; obtain significant compromises from the Government of Sudan; and ensure that the new agreement is implemented in a fair and timely manner.

2) All parties to the conflict to immediately abide by the Ceasefire arrangements provided by DPA and the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement. In particular, the Government of Sudan and the *Janjaweed* militia must end their military offensive in Darfur.

3) The full implementation of all Security Council Resolutions relating to Darfur, and in particular SCR 1556 and 1591. Measures taken under SCR 1591 must also be extended to include: the establishment of a verification component to the arms embargo (end-use certification); the expansion of the arms embargo to the entire country; and the establishment of a no-fly zone over Darfur.

4) The creation of a UN Chapter VIII mandate for an expanded AU force in Darfur. Such a mandate would have the effective protection of the civilian population in Darfur at its centre, and it would allow the peacekeeping troops to robustly defend safe-areas and humanitarian corridors.

5) The provision by the UN, EU, AU, Arab League and NATO of financial, military and logistical support so that AU peacekeepers can carry out their mandate. In particular, AU troop contributing countries in Africa should immediately bring the force up to its authorised ceiling.

This report will examine the human rights situation in Darfur and the issue of genocide; gender-based violence and rape in Darfur; international involvement in the conflict in Darfur; attempts at peace in Sudan; the impediments to peace in Darfur; the regional dimension of the conflict and options for peacekeeping in Darfur and neighbouring countries.

INTRODUCTION

Louise Roland-Gosselin

At an historic summit in New York in September 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the principle known as the "Responsibility to Protect". The document states that, "*Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect*"¹.

The implications of adopting this high-minded policy are twofold. First, no government can hide behind the veil of sovereignty while it conducts or permits crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Second, countries have a responsibility to act beyond their borders in order to put an end to such atrocities.

Darfur presents the international community with a test case for the responsibility to protect. Since 2003 the Government of Sudan has perpetrated war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide on the civilian population in Darfur. Despite this the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and the Arab League have failed to fulfil their responsibility to protect civilians in Darfur from widespread and systematic human rights violations.

As a result, the situation in Darfur has deteriorated, threatening the stability of Sudan as a whole, as well as neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic. In the past three years it is estimated that up to 400,000 people have died as a result of attacks, and more than 2.5 million people have been displaced. There was a glimmer of hope in May 2006 when the Government of Sudan and Minni Minawi's faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Yet, despite the DPA, attacks against civilians have increased and the humanitarian and security situation is at its worst since 2004.

The political situation in Darfur and in Sudan in general is in crisis, with both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the DPA near collapse. While the Eritrean authorities have instigated a mediation process in Asmara aimed at resolving the crisis, British and American diplomats continue to press Darfur's rebel groups to sign the DPA. However, promoting the DPA as the key to peace in Darfur is ill-judged given its lack of credibility with civilians affected by the violence in Darfur. Rebel groups cite the weakness of the DPA's power- and wealth-sharing provisions and, more importantly, the refusal of the Government of Sudan to implement the DPA. As if to confirm their fears, the Minister of Defence, Abdel Rahim, recently stated

that Darfur rebels groups are to be "wiped out," leading Darfuri civilians and rebels alike to question Khartoum's commitment to the peace process.

Furthermore, widespread insecurity and instability have seriously hampered the delivery of relief aid. In recent months, humanitarian agencies have had considerably less access to affected populations than they did two years ago². Humanitarian agencies continue to operate in an extremely dangerous environment. The World Food Programme (WFP) reported that it could not reach as many as 350,000 people in August 2006, with dire consequences for the population affected by conflict, 70% of whom they consider to be food insecure³.

The Government of Sudan has in fact deliberately undermined humanitarian efforts in Sudan. For example, the Panel of Experts' October report⁴ noted that new legislation entitled, "Organization of voluntary and humanitarian and work act," (March 2006) has added unnecessary delays and obstacles to the work of foreign NGOs.

Recently, two aid agencies were forced to suspend their operations in Darfur. On November 10, the Norwegian Refugee Council had to close down its relief operations in Darfur, a move that will affect 300,000 IDPs. The Government of Sudan had suspended the NRC for the last two months – the fifth such suspension since mid 2004 – claiming the NGO posed a threat to Sudan's sovereignty and that it was dissuading IDPs from returning home. The more likely explanation is that the NRC had just issued a report on 80 incidents of rape in Kalma camp in South Darfur⁵. Additionally, on November 15, the International Organization for Migration was expelled from South Darfur State for allegedly inciting the 2.5 million people in camps not to return home⁶.

The 7,700-strong African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which is in charge of peacekeeping in Darfur until the end of 2006, has manifestly failed to provide adequate protection to civilians in Darfur. It lacks the funds, equipment and mandate to carry out its protective role.

Consequently the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 (August 2006) created a mandate for a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur that would, if implemented, allow for the effective protection of Darfuri civilians. However, in the past three months, the international community has appeased the Government of Sudan, accepting its dogged refusal to allow a UN peacekeeping force. Regrettably, the UN, EU and in particular the US and the UK have executed a significant policy reversal, adopting an increasingly accommodating posture towards Khartoum in the name of flexibility.

On November 16, at a meeting in Addis Ababa, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan unveiled his three-step plan for an AU-UN hybrid force for Darfur. The plan was presented to the five permanent members of the UNSC (France, Russia, China, Britain and the USA), the AU, the Arab League and the Sudanese Government. Annan's plan envisaged a \$21 million support package to the AU, with the deployment of several hundred soldiers and police, and finally a 17,000-strong hybrid force, under UN command and control, to conduct peacekeeping duties in Darfur.

However, at the African Union Peace and Security Council meeting on November 30, the AU extended AMIS's mandate for a further six months. The Council also endorsed the proposal for an AU-UN hybrid force but, under great pressure from Khartoum, it conceded ground to the Government of Sudan by deciding that the UN would only have a supportive role.

Once again, civilians in Darfur will bear the consequences of the international community's reluctance to stand up to Khartoum and demand an end to the genocide. The Government of Sudan is acutely aware that Annan's hybrid force has an unclear basis in international law. Going on its past performance, the Khartoum regime can be relied upon to exploit this to its advantage. They know, as we should know, that unless the peacekeeping force has a mandate to provide effective protection to civilians, guaranteed by the international community, the genocide in Darfur will continue unabated.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN DARFUR AND THE ISSUE OF GENOCIDE

Louise Roland-Gosselin

Human Rights Violations in Darfur

Civilians in Darfur continue to suffer severe human rights abuses. Humanitarian law and human rights law are systematically violated, and war crimes and crimes against humanity are perpetrated with impunity against a defenceless population.

For several years, the UN Commission on Human Rights warned of the potentially explosive situation in Darfur. As early as 1997, Gaspar Biro, the Special Rapporteur on Sudan, made the Commission aware that serious inter-tribal clashes were taking place in Darfur⁷.

Despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, there has been an upsurge in violence in the region resulting in the indiscriminate killing of civilians, widespread rape and displacement.

Attacks on civilians

The UN International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur⁸, in addition to several reports from UN Special Rapporteurs, holds the Government of Sudan and their proxies, the *Janjaweed* militias responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes against the people of Darfur. It is beyond question that the Government of Sudan's armed forces, police and security services as well as the Government-backed *Janjaweed* militia participate in systematic, widespread and indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Darfur⁹.

Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Services in particular have engaged in the beating and torture of civilians, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention without trial. Recent reports by the High Commissioner for Human Rights¹⁰ and the Panel of Experts¹¹ indicate that in past few months elements of Sudan's security apparatus have embarked on a campaign of intimidation, targeting activists and community leaders suspected of organizing demonstrations against the DPA.

Sexual and gender-based violence continues to be widespread in Darfur. Women are systematically raped by both security forces and the *Janjaweed* militias. Sima Samar's most recent report¹² confirms that sexual and gender-based violence has increased dramatically throughout Darfur since August 2006. With a reduction of AMIS "firewood" patrols due to financial restrictions, attacks on women in the vicinity of IDP camps are also taking place more frequently.

Government authorities are reluctant to address the scale of sexual violence, and the local government in Southern Darfur downplays sexual assaults, linking them instead to general criminal activity in the camps. Police forces are unable or unwilling to ensure law and order in and around the IDP camps, and police authorities at the highest level deny and reject the complaints of rape victims¹³.

Military operations and the destruction of villages

Since the DPA was signed, military offensives by all parties to the war have taken on a new momentum, and civilians are specifically targeted for supporting groups seen as opposing the DPA.

The Panel of Experts¹⁴ reports that attacks on villages by Government forces and their militia proxies are intensifying. Minni Minawi's faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) is assisting in this ruthless campaign, committing atrocities against the civilian population, earning it the name of "*Janjaweed 2*".

The combined attacks by Sudanese Armed Forces, *Janjaweed* and SLM/A (M) forces against those perceived as opposing to the DPA involve government Antonov aircrafts and MI-24 helicopters. Although the Government of Sudan continues to deny it, numerous investigations, including those by the Panel of Experts', cite testimonies from witnesses who have seen Government aerial reconnaissance flights and hostile, offensive military overflights in Darfur. This activity is in clear violation of the N'Djamena Agreement, and the DPA, not to mention several UN Security Council Resolutions¹⁵.

Recent report of attacks

In the past three months there have been repeated attacks on civilian populations, two of which have warranted a report by the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In her fifth periodic report on Sudan¹⁶, the High Commissioner deplores the attacks between the 28th and 30th of August 2006 by militia groups from the Habbania tribe (one of the main Arab tribes of Darfur) perpetrated on an estimated 45 villages in the locality of Buram in South Darfur.

Members of the Zaghawa, Massalit and Misseryia Jebel tribes were targeted. They were killed and injured, their cattle and property were extensively looted and their villages were burned to the ground. The militia involved wore khaki uniforms similar to those of government forces, and traveled on horse and camel back. They were accompanied by vehicles and carried rocket-propelled grenades and vehicle-mounted machine guns - heavy weaponry

that the Habbania militiamen do not possess.

Civilians fleeing the fighting in the Buram area were further attacked by militias from the Government-allied Fallata tribe, causing the displaced population to scatter even further and hampering efforts to deliver aid to those in need. Evidence of coordination between the Fallata and Habbania tribes in the attacks was provided by several witnesses.

Neither local nor national government authorities have conducted adequate inquiries into the attacks, dismissing the violence as "the usual tribal conflict". However, contrary to official claims, the attacks clearly took place with Government blessing and tangible backing, and the support of the Sudanese armed forces in the form of vehicles and weapons.

The motive behind the attacks is straightforward: Khartoum wishes to change the demography of the region from 'African' into entirely 'Arab' before international troops can stop the ethnic cleansing and maintain the status quo¹⁷.

The High Commissioner's sixth report on Sudan¹⁸ also details *Janjaweed* attacks against several villages and one IDP camp south and west of Jebel Moon area in West Darfur. Between 300 and 500 militiamen from the Arab Gimir tribe, riding on horseback and wearing military uniforms, attacked villagers with Kalashnikovs and rocked propelled grenades. Witnesses saw men wearing the insignia of Sudanese Armed Forces military officers. Fifty civilians including twenty-six children of mainly African origin were killed, while their livestock and property were looted. Neither local authorities nor nearby soldiers took any effective action¹⁹.

Lack of Human Rights Accountability Mechanisms in Darfur

As early as January 2003, Gerhard Baum, the Special Rapporteur on the Human rights situation in Sudan, expressed concern at the impunity with which the security services operated, and the lack of accountability in the special courts established in Darfur²⁰. In January and August 2006, Sima Samar noted the lack of implementation of measures aimed at protecting Darfuri civilians and ensuring accountability, as well as the delays in resolving cases and the disappointing decisions by the Special Criminal Court on Darfur²¹.

All five reports issued by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, have been bluntly critical of Khartoum's unwillingness to put an end to human rights violations in Darfur. The reports condemn the continuing violence in Darfur, the absence of human rights accountability throughout Sudan, and the inefficiency and partiality of the few

measures implemented by the Government of Sudan²².

Sudanese efforts to establish accountability and ensure justice and reparation for the victims and survivors in Darfur have so far been inadequate. Neither the CPA nor the DPA have addressed the need for human rights accountability, and widespread impunity for human rights violations remains the norm in Darfur.

Genocide in Darfur

There is still disagreement about whether what is happening in Darfur amounts to genocide under the UN 1948 Genocide Convention ("*acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group*"²³).

Two key investigations have examined the issue. The first was conducted jointly by the US State Department, the Coalition of International Justice (CIJ), and the United States Agency for International Development. Its findings were published in its September 2004 report²⁴. It found the Government of Sudan and the *Janjaweed* guilty of committing genocide in Darfur against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa.

The investigators said there was clear evidence that the violence had been directed specifically against ethnic groups protected by the Genocide Convention. They also concluded that prohibited acts were committed with the intent to destroy a substantial part of the protected groups. The victims were targeted because they were Black Sudanese, in addition to being members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes.

Following the report, the UN Security Council established its own International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur. The UN report²⁵, published in January 2005, found the same evidence as the American report, but it concluded the Government of Sudan and the *Janjaweed* were guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes, rather than genocide. The Commission searched in vain for a genocidal master plan or policy of the Sudanese state and, in its absence, concluded that genocide had not been committed. The report nonetheless claimed that some Government officials might have had a genocidal intent, leaving the door open for a possible future determination of genocide by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

It is important to note that the UN Commission does not take into account recent jurisprudence relating to the prosecution of the crime of genocide. In particular, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda *Akayesu*²⁶ case concluded that genocidal intent could be inferred from actions, and in

particular from the deliberate and systematic targeting of a group, as well as from the general political doctrine of the perpetrator of the crime. Khartoum's racist and radical Islamist ideology, and the abundant evidence of the specific targeting by Government troops and militias of civilians belonging to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups, surely constitute proof of genocidal intent.

The UN has demonstrated that it is unable to prevent genocide when its member states are reluctant to act. Knowing that key states were unable or unwilling to take necessary action in Darfur, the UN chose not to commit itself under the Genocide Convention. Observers might therefore question the usefulness of adopting policies such as the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, while such a moral vacuum exists at the heart of the UN.

GENDER BASED VIOLENCE AND RAPE IN DARFUR

Amy Sutton

Since the conflict began in 2003, women and girls in Darfur have been singled out and subjected to the systematic use of rape, gang-rape and abduction into sexual slavery²⁷. As if the targeted and deliberate use of rape against Black African Darfurians were not bad enough, the same population has endured murder and torture, mainly at the hands of the *Janjaweed* and Sudanese government armed forces.

One unwelcome by-product of the conflict is that some women and female child survivors in IDP camps have been forced to turn to 'survival prostitution' to provide for family members who are dependent on them.²⁸ Despite the peace agreements, the humanitarian crisis has worsened and the number of women and girls raped has increased alarmingly. Indeed, the latest UN Panel of Experts report concludes that the DPA has "ratcheted up" tensions in the region²⁹.

According to a 2004 Amnesty International report, the *Janjaweed's* campaign of sexual violence has been committed in coordination with government soldiers and air force, "in a systematic manner... with total impunity," and with "the full knowledge or acquiescence of the government army"³⁰.

Women and girls are particularly vulnerable when they leave the camps to look for essential firewood, water and food. Although AMIS provided some firewood patrols, it no longer has the resources to provide sufficient protection³¹. Recent testimonies gathered by Amnesty International researchers in July and August this year reveal that the *Janjaweed* are also attacking IDP camps in Chad where there is little or no AMIS presence. Furthermore it seems AMIS is reluctant to act upon rape reports. Indeed, a 35 year old Masalit woman, from the village of Tungfuka, West Darfur, testified that:

"The AU [AMIS] is not interested in the displaced. They do not take any action after we complain. When girls are raped in the neighbourhood of the camp, the AU's only action is to bring the girl back to the camp. They do not carry out any investigation into the event. The UN would do a much better job than the AU"³².

Victims and witnesses have provided accounts of gang-rape of young girls and women; public rape and gang-rape as a form of humiliation; rape of pregnant women, in one case, reportedly slitting open a pregnant women's stomach; torture to extract information about a relative's whereabouts - residents of IDP camps commonly speak of having nails pulled out during interrogation; abduction of

both women and young girls, and keeping them in sexual slavery, often breaking their limbs to prevent escape³³. Human Rights Watch reports increasing levels of brutality in the conflict since late October 2006, with common practices now including the deliberate burning to death of women by the *Janjaweed*³⁴.

Widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual violence constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)³⁵ have upheld such determinations. In the case of Darfur, evidence gathered by Amnesty International and other human rights organizations suggests that not only is rape and other sexual violence being used as a weapon of war, but that, in combination with other forms of widespread and systematic violence, it amounts to genocide.

Under Article II of the Genocide Convention (1948), genocide can involve: killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group that are committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group³⁶. Genocide Testimonies from Darfuri refugees at IDP camps in Chad make it clear that this has been the case since the beginning of the conflict:

"The village was attacked during the night in October 2003, when the Arabs came by cars and on horses. They said "every black woman must be killed, even the children"³⁷.

"I saw many cases of *Janjaweed* raping women and girls. They are happy when they rape. They sing when they rape and tell that we are just slaves and that they can do with us how they wish"³⁸.

Numerous other testimony and reports catalogue the use of racist language and chanting during *Janjaweed* attacks and raids. Furthermore, the resulting pregnancies increase the stigma attached to the women who have been raped. They may be disowned by their husband or community, and their children may be outcast. In this way rape helps to unravel the 'social fabric' of Darfur³⁹. In addition women survivors are infected with HIV/AIDS, and lacking sufficient medical care, they pass it on to their children and others, making a second wave of genocide likely. The same has happened in Rwanda⁴⁰.

According to Sima Samar, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights to Sudan, the perpetrators continue to act in a climate of immunity. At an UNMIS press briefing, on her third visit to Sudan, she described, "*not only a lack of prevention and protection but also lack of justice for the crimes that are committed. (...) Sudanese efforts at establishing accountability and ensuring justice and reparation for the victims and survivors of the conflict have so far proved inadequate*"⁴¹.

Until recently women were legally required to report rape to the police in order to receive medical attention. In October 2006, the UN Panel of Experts welcomed the change in the law, but noted that there has been minimal progress made in the judicial process⁴². The Special Criminal Court of the Events in Darfur, established in June 2005, and the Investigation Committees have done little to investigate or hold perpetrators accountable. Police are unable or unwilling to carry out investigations⁴³. According to the Special Rapporteur to Sudan, any changes amounts to "*window-dressing,*" not "*real solutions*"⁴⁴.

In August 2005 the Government of Sudan amended the Armed Forces Act, giving the General Commander the discretion to prosecute individuals. Predictably, the higher-ranking officials have continued to operate with impunity. As of December 2005, only 6 of an identified 200 cases had been referred to the Special Criminal Court. Amongst those that were prosecuted, none reflected the severity of the crimes against humanity occurring in Darfur⁴⁵. The special investigatory committees themselves continue to be poorly resourced and their work is hampered by a lack of transparency in methodology and outcome, a lack of impartiality and a failure to address State responsibility⁴⁶.

Sudanese President al-Bashir recently explained for the benefit of the international community that Sudanese customs did not allow for the existence of rape. Therefore the lack of progress in stopping rape and sexual violence is unsurprising. The Minister of Justice, Mohamed Ali al-Maradi has also called western media reports of rape and murder, "*baseless.*" Like other Khartoum officials, he believes justice can be dispensed by the Sudanese judicial system, rather than the International Criminal Court⁴⁷. The Chairman of the Special Court, Mahmoud Abkam, also calls mass rape a "*western fabrication,*" thereby justifying the government's policy of not prosecuting rape crimes⁴⁸.

So long as the Sudanese government denies the existence of rape or the extent of its use as a weapon of war in Darfur, it is unlikely that gender-based violence will end. Nor are there grounds to

believe that civilians will receive the protection they seek, even in IDP camps. This places the onus on the international community to protect human rights and punish rights violations. Underlying the ongoing misery of the people of Darfur is the rest of the world's refusal to acknowledge the genocidal intent of the Government of Sudan. Rape is a key aspect of such a policy, and it will continue on a systematic scale until the international community summons up the collective will to demand that Khartoum put an end to it.

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN DARFUR

Louise Roland-Gosselin

Darfur has not brought out the best in the world's international and regional organizations. In the past three years it seems politicians and diplomats around the globe have lacked the political will to put an end to human rights atrocities taking place in full view of the world. The African Union, United Nations, European Union and Arab League have either supported the Khartoum regime, or have failed to take appropriate action in the face of state-perpetrated genocide.

The African Union

Given the West's unwillingness to get involved in Darfur, the African Union sponsored talks in Abuja, resulting in a peacekeeping mission to monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in April 2004. However, neither the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) nor the African Union's mediation efforts have succeeded in bringing to an end the atrocities in Darfur.

To say the least, a lack of experience and training has seriously hampered the mediating efforts of the AU⁴⁹. As a result, the process was slow, with mediators failing to create a broad consensus amongst the different parties or to obtain sufficient compromises from the Government of Sudan.

With a last minute involvement of the US and UK, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed on May 5th 2006 between the Government of Sudan and Minawi's faction of the SLM. The main stumbling block for many Darfuris remains the unwillingness of the Government of Sudan to allow wealth- and power-sharing. Hence several Darfur rebel groups refused to sign the agreement, thereby threatening its credibility. In the six months since the signing of the DPA in Abuja, the African Union has consistently failed to meet the deadlines of its own agreement.

The AU was tasked with monitoring various ceasefires, and generally contributing to a secure environment in Darfur. Yet, its 7,700-strong African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been hampered by insufficient experience and a weak mandate, as well as a lack of funds, training, equipment and logistical support. These shortcomings have seriously undermined the AMIS. As a result, the AU has been unable to protect civilians or ensure the effective delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced populations⁵⁰.

The United Nations

Despite numerous independent reports cataloguing crimes committed against the civilian population in

Darfur by the Government of Sudan and its proxies, the UN has done little to stop the genocide. Rather, it has delegated responsibility for mediation and monitoring the ceasefire to the AU, invoking the 'Brahimi Principle' that regional organization should have primary responsibility for conflicts within their region. As a result, the UN has adopted a supportive role, preferring to concentrate on the implementation of the CPA.

However, following alarming reports by three fact-finding missions in April 2004, pressure for action mounted within the UN. It resulted in the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1556, imposing an arms embargo on the *Janjaweed* militia and the rebels, and calling for Khartoum to disarm the *Janjaweed* within 30 days or face sanctions. Jan Pronk appeased Khartoum by helpfully extended the period to 90 days: Security Council Resolution 1556 has yet to be implemented.

In September 2004, Security Council Resolution 1564 led to an International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur (ICID). As mentioned above, its report, published in January 2005, concluded that the GoS and the *Janjaweed* were guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes⁵¹. The Commission strongly recommended referring Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which the Security Council did, eventually, in March 2005. The ICC prosecutor duly opened an investigation on Darfur in June 2005, but it has been conspicuously slow.

Throughout this period the Government of Sudan and rebel groups continually failed to comply with their commitments under the ceasefire agreement and the arms embargo. Consequently in March 2005 UN Security Council Resolution 1591 appointed a Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts to investigate imposing a broader range of sanctions such as travel restrictions and asset freezes.

Despite massive ongoing human rights violations in villages and refugee camps across Darfur, it took thirteen months for the Security Council to designate four individuals against whom targeted financial and travel-related sanctions should, in theory, be imposed. The four men are Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan (a Sudanese army commander), Sheikh Musa Hilal (head of the *Janjaweed*), Adam Yacub Shant (SLA commander) and Abdel Karim Bari 'Tek' (NMRD commander). Under pressure from British, American and French diplomats, the Security Council put equal blame on all parties rather than recognizing the varying degrees of responsibility for crimes committed against Darfuri civilians. Moral equivalency triumphed yet again.

In their October 2006 report⁵², the Panel of Experts

noted that blatant violations of the arms embargo by all parties continue unabated, and that the Government of Sudan is still supporting the *Janjaweed* with weapons and vehicles. The travel ban and the financial sanctions remain unenforced.

As AMIS' funding problems persisted, and as it struggled to carry out its mandate, a proposal to replace AMIS with a UN force gathered momentum within the UN. On August 31 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1706, creating a mandate for a 20,000-strong UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, contingent, crucially and fatally, on Khartoum's consent. Not surprisingly the Government of Sudan exercised its veto, and plans for a Chapter VII force have been abandoned. As already mentioned, Kofi Annan has attempted to promote an AU-UN hybrid force, with disappointing results.

By refusing to sanction parties for their constant breach of obligations, the UN has systematically failed to ensure the implementation of its resolutions. It has also signaled its lack of will to Khartoum. UN action in Darfur has therefore resulted in little more than a half-hearted rhetorical expression of concern, which is of little comfort to the long-suffering survivors of Sudan's genocidal military campaign.

The European Union

The European Union's twenty-five member states account for a quarter of the world's gross national product. With these assets, the EU does not lack the resources to act in Darfur. Yet, despite its combined diplomatic, economic and military power, Europe has not used its leverage to pressure Khartoum into abiding by its international obligations and accept a UN force to protect civilians.

The EU's hypocrisy and lack of resolve has been apparent since September 2004 when the European Parliament declared that the actions of the Sudanese government in Darfur were 'tantamount to genocide'⁵³. By including the qualifier that Khartoum's actions were virtually genocide, the EU put itself on the record as deploring the crime, yet wiggled out of a contractual obligation under the UN Genocide Convention to act.

The European Parliament also threatened Khartoum with sanctions if no tangible progress was achieved in meeting UN demands to stop the killing. However, when EU Foreign Ministers met in Luxembourg in October 2006, they promptly reaffirmed their decision not to impose sanctions on Khartoum, despite it openly flouting its obligations and defiantly resisting UN Security Council Resolution 1706.

Although the recent EU External Relations Council Meeting emphasised that, "*a UN operation is the only realistic option for a sustainable, long-term peacekeeping operation in Darfur*"⁵⁴, the strongest measure the Europeans will push for is some form of hybrid AU-UN force. The EU's Javier Solana, in addition to French and British officials, has been strikingly accommodating to Khartoum in the past few weeks, clearly indicating to the Government of Sudan that no action will be taken if they rejects UN peacekeepers in Darfur.

Given that the US is entangled in Iraq, the possibility of strong American leadership for a UN mission in Darfur is remote. Consequently true leadership is now required from countries such as France and Germany. While NATO has provided some logistics and transport to the AU force in Darfur, further military assistance from European countries is necessary in order to put an end to the attacks against civilians in Darfur.

European diplomats have been consistently ineffective despite the EU's determination that ethnically-based war crimes and crimes against humanity are under way in Darfur. Such a lack of resolve or effective pressure on the Government of Sudan reassures Khartoum that it can pursue its genocidal campaign in Darfur without interference.

The Arab League

In the last three years, the Arab League has repeatedly failed to condemn the violence in Darfur. Its silence has assured the Government of Sudan that it can commit gross violations of human rights with impunity. The League's reluctance to reprimand Khartoum is usually attributed to the fear that any criticism undermines the Arabic Brotherhood. This sentiment is particularly acute in the current political climate.

The Arab League's decision to hold its annual summit in Khartoum in March 2006 further reassured the National Islamic Front junta that it would continue to receive full diplomatic support from its Arab allies. Unsurprisingly the summit failed to effectively address the crisis in Darfur or pledge necessary funds for AMIS.

Moreover, Arab League members such as Qatar and Algeria have been instrumental in preventing the UN Security Council from adopting or implementing forceful resolutions against Sudan.

Arab states have also applauded Sudan's rejection of UN peacekeeping troops in Darfur. Even non-Arabic states have acquiesced. In a recent commentary, the Eritrean Ministry of Information denounced UN peacekeeping operations as a form of neo-colonialism used to perpetuate conflict and

provide a source of information and espionage⁵⁵.

The seasoned politician-generals of the Sudanese Government rarely put a tactical foot wrong, but in October 2006 they stumbled. They wrote to African and Arab states, warning them that any contribution to UN peacekeeping troops in Darfur would be considered a hostile act. This uncharacteristically heavy-handed approach undermined some of the unconditional support from Arab states usually enjoyed by Khartoum.

Shortly thereafter, a significant editorial by Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid appeared in *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*⁵⁶, a Saudi newspaper reflecting the views of the Saudi Royal Family. The piece openly criticised Khartoum for atrocities in Darfur, describing events in the region as worse than Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq combined. Hopefully such criticism will lead to more constructive and effective pressure on Khartoum to put an end to its genocidal campaign.

If Arab and Muslim leaders want to prove to the international community that they are truly committed to the principles of justice, accountability and respect for human rights, then it is imperative for them to speak out about the genocide in Darfur, constructively engage in the peace talks between rebel movement and the Sudanese Government and pressure Khartoum to stop killing its own civilians.

However, unless the UN, the EU and the Arab League make clear that neither economic nor political interests are more important than ending the atrocities, the killing in Darfur will go on.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE IN SUDAN

Louise Roland-Gosselin

In the last two years, two separate peace agreements have been signed in Sudan. However, neither has brought peace to the country.

In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought an end to twenty-one years of war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the south. Sixteen months later, in May 2006, the Government of Sudan and Minni Minawi's faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

The fact that both agreements are showing severe signs of strain should prompt the international community to question Khartoum's commitment to its undertakings. The NIF/NCP regime and the international community have studiously skirted around the central issue that has troubled Sudan for decades: its borders. Fundamental to the Government of Sudan's strategy is its use of violence to hold together a huge nation whose borders were drawn arbitrarily by its colonial masters. In place of allowing regional autonomy, Khartoum is terrorising the sections of its population, Black and Arab, wanting a measure of independence. Without a genuine effort to devolve power in a federal system, the prospects for peace in Sudan seem bleaker than ever.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Exasperated by two decades of fighting in southern Sudan, resulting in an estimated two million casualties, the CPA was embraced and promoted by the key mediators, the US, the UK and Norway. The US special envoy John Danforth played a crucial role in exerting pressure on the parties to reach a peace agreement. And after three years of negotiations, a breakthrough was finally achieved when the Bush administration rewarded the Government of Sudan with a package of aid and removed its name from the list of states sponsoring terrorism.

Clauses

The CPA contains security, wealth-sharing and power-sharing provisions.

In terms of power-sharing institutions, the CPA introduced a Government of National Unity (GNU), which was sworn in on the 22nd of September 2005. The NCP's Omar Al-Bashir retained the presidency, while the office of first Vice-president went to the leader of the SPLM, John Garang - a position now held by SPLM's Salva Kiir following Garang's untimely death in a helicopter crash. A six-year interim constitution, ratified by the national

legislature, came into force mid-2005.

The CPA also provided for the creation of an autonomous southern regional government, to be presided over by the leader of the SPLM, with its own six-year interim constitution and the possibility to vote on its independence in a referendum in 2011.

Implementation

However, two years on, it appears that the CPA has not yet delivered a lasting peace. The UN Secretary-General's September 2006 report on Sudan⁵⁷ points out that although there has been progress in overall security, the crucial wealth- and power-sharing provisions continue to be contested by the parties.

For instance, the CPA's Ceasefire Joint Military and the Area Joint Military Committees have been largely functioning as intended, investigating violations and resolving disputes through discussions.

However, the Secretary-General also notes that reform of the security services has not taken place, and military and security services continue to suppress civil and political rights and perpetrate abuses with impunity. The National Security Act, which is to regulate the National Security Service and created a National Security Council to implement reforms, has yet to be enacted.

Enforcement of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme has also been slow. There has been little progress on issues such as the North-South border or the conflict in the Abyei area. Finally, continued attacks on civilians by the Lords Resistance Army, and the proliferation of small arms have contributed to increasing insecurity in Southern Sudan⁵⁸.

In his September 2006 report, the Secretary-General was also explicit about the failure to fulfill the wealth- and power-sharing provisions of the CPA, resulting in the continued hegemony of the NCP⁵⁹. It seems that power-sharing has not resulted in a true partnership in national government. The NCP continues to withhold crucial resources and revenues from the Southern Sudan regional government. The SPLM has not been given any important GNU ministries and the former NCP bureaucracy remains in place with little change⁶⁰.

Most significantly, South Sudan is only receiving a third of the oil revenue to which it is entitled. The SPLM and the NCP also continue to disagree on whether the National Petroleum Commission should be an advisory or a decision-making body, on the nature of its relationship with the Ministry of Energy and Mining and on its participation in oil contracts

negotiations⁶¹.

In August 2006, Sima Samar⁶², the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan, deplored the absence of progress in the democratic transition. Legislation in violation of the Interim National Constitution and international human rights standards is still in place. Few of the CPA's commissions function as intended, and legislation necessary to the establishment of the National Human Rights, Civil Service, Land and Electoral Commissions is still pending. There are also no signs that there has been any preparation for the national elections of 2009.

Criticism

In summary, little progress has been made towards a truly comprehensive peace in Sudan. Far from being comprehensive, the CPA is an agreement solely between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM. All other political parties and rebel movements have been excluded from the talks and power- and wealth-sharing agreements, effectively undermining its broader support throughout Sudan⁶³.

Observers are also concerned that the marked failure to make democratic values and inclusiveness central to its operations has undermined the long-term viability of peace in southern Sudan.

Similarly, the near absence of human rights provisions in the CPA is regrettable⁶⁴. The Power-sharing Protocol includes a provision on the establishment of a Human Rights Commission. However, it has not yet been set up, and no details of its mandate are given. Furthermore, even when mechanisms to investigate and address violations of human rights and international law are in place, very little happens⁶⁵.

The future of the CPA is in the hands of the NCP and the SPLM, but their good faith and capacity to implement it remains questionable. The NCP certainly has the capacity to implement the agreement, but lacks the will. The SPLM, meanwhile, is weak and disorganised⁶⁶. If the CPA is to bring peace, the US, UK, Norway and other donor nations who preach the gospel of democracy and human rights must make sure the CPA addresses those issues.

The Darfur Peace Agreement

The problems of Darfur cannot be seen in isolation from two decades of strife in southern Sudan. Put simply, the international community has been so focused on ensuring the success of the CPA that it has been reluctant to offend the Government of Sudan, for fear of prompting the NIF/NCP to walk

away from the CPA. For this reason the African Union has been given the lead role in mediation and peacekeeping in Darfur.

The campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Darfur resulted in more than two and a half million people made homeless, and an estimated 400,000 deaths. Increasing violence and the Government of Sudan's obstruction has made it harder for humanitarian groups to reach people in need, and the ethnic cleansing campaign has spread into Chad and the Central African Republic. Consequently the US and UK are once more engaged in trying to put out the diplomatic fires in Darfur.

In May 2006 the then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and UK Development Secretary Hilary Benn attended peace talks in Abuja in Nigeria. For four days they exerted extreme pressure on the various Darfur rebel groups and the Government of Sudan to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement. Only Minni Minawi's faction of the SLM was swayed by their arguments. Both the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Abdul Wahid's faction of the SLM refused to sign, the former arguing that the power and wealth-sharing provisions did not adequately address the centralization of power and decision-making in Khartoum. Meanwhile Abdul Wahid's group demanded a role in reviewing the *Janjaweed* disarmament, a national Vice-Presidency position for Darfur, more compensation, and the merging of the three current Darfur states into a new unitary region.

In the six months since the DPA, the humanitarian, security and human rights situation in Darfur has deteriorated rapidly. The Government of Sudan has responded to the rebel's recalcitrance with military might. Working in concert, the Sudanese Armed Forces and Minawi's faction have attempted to stamp out opposition in the name of implementing the DPA. To do so they have attacked and destroyed villages under the control of non-signatories of the DPA⁶⁷. The resulting loss of life and displacement of innocent bystanders has been catalogued in disturbing details by humanitarian aid agencies, the AMIS, the UN and human rights organizations.

Clauses

The DPA contains four main sections: the Comprehensive Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, the Power-Sharing and the Wealth-Sharing Arrangements and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC).

The DPA's security arrangements are far more substantial and favourable to the rebels than the power- and wealth-sharing arrangements⁶⁸.

The Security clauses include the complete and verifiable disarmament of the *Janjaweed* and other government militias by mid-October 2006, the integration of the rebel forces into the Sudanese Armed Forces and Police, the protection of IDP camps through the establishment of buffer zones and humanitarian assistance corridors.

Both the power- and the wealth-sharing agreements are relatively weak, with few concessions from Khartoum. For instance, the AU mediation team created a Senior Assistant to the President (4th highest position in the Sudanese Government) and Chairperson of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (the dominant political position in Darfur), held by Minni Minawi since August 2006. The rebel movements were to be awarded seats in the National Assembly and Darfur State legislatures, as well as one position as State Governor of Darfur, two as Deputy State Governors, and senior positions in state ministries.

The rebels' request for a unitary region with a single government was rejected, considered by Khartoum as too much like a first step towards independence. There will in theory be a referendum on devolution to a single region by July 2010. The Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, which has authority over pressing regional issues, is, in effect, a compromise for the interim period leading to the national and regional elections in 2009.

The wealth-sharing provisions established the Darfur Compensation Commission to which the government pledged to grant \$30 million in order to compensate victims of the conflict. The Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund will assist returnees in rebuilding their homes, restocking their livestock and working their fields. The Government is to contribute an initial \$300 million to this end, and \$200 million a year for two additional years. The DPA also called for a Joint Assessment Mission to determine the specific reconstruction and development needs of Darfur, and for the international community to hold a donors conference to pledge additional funds for Darfur.

Finally, the Agreement called for the creation of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, a communal reconciliation process. Its aim is to gain the DPA acceptance among those parts of the population who were not represented in Abuja. In addition the process will facilitate discussions on underlying political and socio-economic issues. Whether the consultation will have any genuine impact on policy making remains to be seen since it is purely advisory. As usual, much of the power remains in Khartoum or with the Darfur authorities⁶⁹.

Implementation

In his November 2006 report⁷⁰, the UN Secretary-General made his concerns about the DPA clear. In unusually blunt language, Kofi Annan said implementation was significantly behind schedule. Furthermore he warned that the inability of the DPA mechanisms and arrangements to halt the continuing violence was undermining the credibility of the Agreement.

Of concern to many Darfuris is the lack of progress in enforcing the security provisions. The Ceasefire Commission has been largely incapacitated by disagreements over the non-DPA signatories' role and the relationship between the N'Djamena and the DPA ceasefire commissions.

On June 23rd 2006, the Government of Sudan submitted to the AU its plan to disarm the *Janjaweed*. Details of the plan are still unknown, and the *Janjaweed* continue to attack civilians with impunity.

Meanwhile there has been an increase in fighting between signatories and non-signatories of the DPA. Both the UN Secretary General's November 2006 report⁷¹ and the UN Panel of Experts' October 2006 report⁷² listed accounts of attacks by Government forces working with Minawi's troops against the National Redemption Front (NRF). There is also a wealth of eyewitness reports of Sudanese armed forces aircrafts being used to bomb villages, for reconnaissance, and logistics support. Both reports deplore the lack of security in IDP camps, and comment on the increased militarization and of camps. Camps that are meant to be places of shelter to civilians who have escaped the terrors of genocide are experiencing widespread assault and theft.

On a positive note, the UN Secretary-General's September 2006 report⁷³ confirmed that the Northern and Southern Darfur state assemblies had convened emergency sessions to amend their interim State Constitutions, increasing ministerial and assembly seats as required by the power-sharing provisions of the DPA.

There have, however, been considerable delays in establishing the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority and a number of other important power-sharing deadlines have been missed, including government and civil service appointments. For instance, the Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission has yet to get off the ground.

Similarly, limited progress has been made on wealth-sharing, one of the rebels' central grievances. The Joint Assessment Mission has begun preparatory work to identify urgent and long-

term recovery and development needs, but it has yet to establish the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund or the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission, or a Compensation Commission⁷⁴.

Not surprisingly the increase in violence has prevented any effective work by the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process. The appointment of General Suwar al Dahab, an old school Islamist, as the Chairman of the conference, casts doubts on its effectiveness in allowing for a genuine airing of the peoples' concerns.

The Crisis Group⁷⁵ notes, the inclusion of Government and rebel representatives in the consultation process's preparatory committee, the credibility of the body is greatly weakened. In its October report the UN Panel of Experts⁷⁶ also notes that the meetings differ from the traditional ways of settling disputes, by often excluding legitimate and respected community leaders.

Criticism

The Darfur Peace Agreement has manifestly failed to deliver peace to the region, just as its signatories have failed to abide by it. In retrospect it seems that by adopting a strategy of deadline diplomacy, mediators at the talks lost sight of the distinction between getting parties to sign an agreement, and obtaining their sincere commitment to its terms and implementation⁷⁷. As a result, the DPA is partial, structurally weak, and does not address the root causes of the conflict in Darfur.

It is essential that the remaining rebel groups and political factions sign onto the Agreement if there is to be a lasting peace in Sudan. However, the answer to the current impasse is not simply to exert more pressure on the non-signatory parties. The AU, the UK and US must extract compromises from the Government of Sudan, and most importantly, they must ensure they are implemented.

IMPEDIMENTS TO PEACE IN DARFUR

Louise Roland-Gosselin

Since the Darfur crisis came to the world's notice in 2003, the UN, EU and the Arab League have failed to present a united front to Khartoum. Without concerted pressure from the international community, the Government of Sudan has no reason to start abiding by its obligations under the CPA, DPA and numerous Security Council Resolutions. Regrettably, individual nations have put their economic and political relationships with Khartoum ahead of any genuine concern for Darfur.

Economic interests

Several UN members have significant business ties with Sudan. China in particular has a strong industrial and economic relationship with Khartoum. For instance, China has a 40% stake in Sudan's oil fields, and it has invested more than \$4 billion dollars in the last year⁷⁸. China has also signed deals with Sudan to exploit the country's gold and iron deposits, with production starting in 2007⁷⁹. At the Sino-African Summit in November, China further agreed on £2 billion of corporate deals and \$5 billion of loans to Sudan.

Far from using its influence to pressure Khartoum into putting an end to its genocidal policy in Darfur, China has instead refused to interfere in the country's internal affairs and has provided diplomatic cover for Sudan. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has continuously vetoed or watered down Security Council Resolutions aimed at forceful action against the Sudanese Government⁸⁰. It was China's refusal to agree to SC Resolution 1706 that led to the inclusion of a clause requiring Khartoum's consent. At the Sino-African Heads of States Summit in Beijing, Chinese president Hu Jintao reiterated his support to Omar Al-Bahir and insisted on respect for the principle of non-interference in Sudanese affairs.

Russia also has a significant economic stake in Sudan. In 2002 it signed a \$200 million oil deal, and it has sold \$150 million worth of military equipment to Khartoum. Russia therefore fears that sanctions could provide a loophole for the Sudanese government to default on its payments⁸¹. Together with Qatar and China, Russia has consistently vetoed or diluted Security Council Resolutions aimed at imposing economic sanctions on Sudan.

British and French companies also have oil interests in Sudan. The French oil company Total pays \$1.5 million a year to the Government of Sudan for its right to keep the non-producing Block B in the South of the country⁸². Meanwhile, the British oil exploration firm White Nile has announced that it

will be drilling three oil wells in South Sudan in 2007⁸³.

The United States is in the most ambiguous position of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Thanks so pressure from the Christian Right, the Congressional Black Caucus and human rights groups, the US has been extremely vocal on human rights abuses, first in southern Sudan and now in Darfur. But despite labeling events in Darfur as genocide, the US has not matched its words with action. This is partly due to pressure from American oil companies keen for the US Congress to revoke its trade and investment embargo against Sudan⁸⁴.

Political interests

The North-South peace deal, the CPA, has the strong support of the international community, led by the deals' mediators, the UK, US and Norway. However, reports of government-perpetrated human rights atrocities in Darfur compromised the mediation process in Naivasha. As has already been mentioned, the international community refused to put pressure on Khartoum for fear that the CPA would fail. As a result, Darfur rebels were excluded from the deal and the CPA was pushed through at the expense of an adequate resolution and sufficient response to the conflict in Darfur⁸⁵. This strategy was piloted by Alan Gouly, the UK's FCO special envoy to Sudan at the time, and his American counterpart Jon Danforth. In effect, it let Khartoum off the hook by allowing it to threaten not to implement the Agreement whenever events in Darfur were raised.

The War on Terror now shapes US and UK foreign policy, and both governments are eager to obtain information on terrorist activities from countries such as Pakistan and Sudan. Khartoum provided a sanctuary and business base to Osama bin Laden for five years in the nineties, and the regime has since been skillful in cashing in on its supposed knowledge of the Al-Qaeda leadership. In April 2005, the CIA's private jet brought Salah Abdallah Gosh, head of Sudanese intelligence,⁸⁶ to its Langley, Virginia headquarters to be thoroughly debriefed. Simultaneously, President Bush dropped references to Darfur's genocide. It has also been alleged that the White House tried to remove Gosh's name from the secret list of 51 individuals accused of war crimes in Darfur⁸⁷. Following pressure from lobbying groups, the US has subsequently denied Gosh entry into the US.

In contrast, the mastermind of Khartoum's policy of ethnic cleansing is still welcome in Britain. In March and September 2006, Gosh was invited to the UK. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was coincidentally in London at the time of both visits. The FCO justifies its relationship with

senior Sudanese figures as necessary to take forward the Darfur peace process⁸⁸. However, granting Gosh an entry visa, given the accusations against him, cannot qualify as exerting pressure on Khartoum. Not surprisingly it is perceived as further evidence of Britain's cravenness to the Sudanese junta, and its lack of resolve to find a lasting and just solution to Darfur.

Instead of exerting real political pressure on Khartoum, with unanimous support for UN resolutions, the international community has chosen to pursue its own economic and strategic interests at the expense of continuing human rights violations in Darfur. This pursuit of national self-interests has resulted in insufficient and uncoordinated international pressure on Sudan, which has crippled the international community with a lack of credibility.

THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR

Damien Percy

Conflict and instability know no borders, and having an unstable neighbour can have a detrimental effect on the security and stability of surrounding countries, regions and whole continents. Khartoum's policies in Darfur have already threatened the stability of Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), but if its campaign of genocide continues unchecked, it could have a catastrophic affect on several neighbours and the region as a whole. There is also a tradition in Africa of governments offering funds, sanctuary and arms to opponents of their neighbours as part of a strategy to undermine them. This is currently fuelling conflict and resentment throughout the countries of the greater horn of Africa.

There is a visible reduction in stability in the region, particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad that can be linked directly with the conflict in Sudan

The UNHCR reports its work is being made increasingly difficult by the deteriorating security situation around and beyond the borders of Sudan. It is self-evident that if it is left unchecked the humanitarian disaster will become more expensive and difficult to resolve. Sudan has five million internally displaced people, and hundreds of thousands of its citizens have already fled to neighbouring countries for safety. Yet, a concerted effort by regional organisations and the international community could stabilise the resource-rich region and lead to significant progress towards the UN's Millennium Development Goals.

It would also be in the interests of nations concerned with defeating terrorism to focus on the repercussions of Sudan's current reckless policies. Al-Qaeda has made no secret of its ambition to reinstate the caliphate, and Sudan and the Horn of Africa are a front in their war against the West. There is a chance that a prolonged period of insecurity, instability and hardship for the people of the region might possibly foster the type of discontent that could be carefully exploited by Al-Qaeda.

Chad

As this report goes to press, the government of Chad is under sustained attack by rebels, reportedly funded and supported by Khartoum. In April 2006, a month after an attempted military coup, a group of rebels based in Sudan attacked the Chad capital, N'Djamena. The United Front for Change attempted to overthrow President Deby, leaving hundreds dead. Their attack illustrated Chad's military

vulnerability: a relatively small rebel force was able to travel across the country from the Eastern border to the capital in the West with alarming ease. Deby was in no doubt that Khartoum was behind the attack, and he cut diplomatic ties, marking a continued deterioration in relations between the two countries.

Since then the incursions have been increasingly bold and deadly, reaching 100 kilometres inside Chad. Most observers agree that the invaders are the same Khartoum-backed *Janjaweed* fighters who have laid waste to large parts of Darfur. UNHCR reports that since the end of October 2006 at least twenty villages in Chad have been razed, another twenty have been abandoned, 200 civilians have been murdered, and thousands have fled. It is believed that as many as 68,000 Chadians have left the region in the past year as a direct result of the "spill over" from Sudan.⁸⁹ The UNHCR High Commissioner António Guterres has called for an international presence in Chad to help maintain security, stating that: "Deteriorating security has left us unable to provide even minimal help across wide areas of Darfur, and resources in neighbouring Chad have been stretched to the limit. An already bad situation is worsening by the day."⁹⁰

More recently President Deby and the AU chairman have requested that UN troops be stationed in the region, to protect the border regions of both Chad and CAR.

A quarter of a million Sudanese have gone to Chad, rather optimistically seeking refuge from the violence in Darfur, only to find their attackers have followed them. Humanitarian groups trying to help the refugees are increasingly subject to looting and carjacking, and clashes between the army and rebels are causing greater numbers of local people to abandon their homes. As this report goes to press, thirteen aid workers have so far been killed, the most recent being on November 22nd. Oxfam reports that its greatest problem is the growing insecurity,⁹¹ and militias increasingly view the refugee camps as recruiting grounds, with evidence of arms trafficking. It is difficult to over-state how volatile Chad now is, how rapidly the conflict is spreading, and how devastating the effects could be upon the region.

Central African Republic (CAR)

The spillover from Darfur is also affecting northern CAR. Yet again Sudan is giving material aid to an anti-government insurgency in which at least 150,000 people have become internally displaced. In the last year as many as 40,000 civilians have fled to Chad and 20,000 to Cameroon. Between the 29th of October and the 11th of November the rebels captured three significant towns in the largely

lawless north eastern region of the country resulting in 10,000 people fleeing their homes.⁹² Rebels are now 150km from diamond mines that account for 40% of CAR's total export earnings. Capturing the mines would allow the rebels to fund their insurgency with ease, as well as cripple the economy of one of Africa's more impoverished countries.

Like Chad, CAR has requested UN troops. Rebels are reported to be marching towards the town of Bria in which Chadian troops are stationed. The whole of the greater horn of Africa is in very real danger of descending into a dangerous and costly series of intergroup and interstate conflicts if significant efforts are not made to stabilise the region immediately.

The broader picture could not be more troubling: tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia are flaring up once again, and the battle continues for control of Somalia between the Union of Islamic Courts and the interim government, backed by Ethiopia. The key to reducing the risk of a massive and sprawling conflict lies in the international community's response to the Khartoum regime. While the Government of Sudan is unchecked, it will continue to destabilise its neighbours, with alarming knock-on results. Both region and international players are displaying a curiously short-sighted reluctance to restrain the junta in Khartoum.

WHAT NEXT AFTER AMIS?: PEACEKEEPING OPTIONS IN DARFUR AND ITS NEIGHBOURS.

Jamie Weatherhead

The atrocities committed in the Darfur region of Sudan are of a scale not seen since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Darfur therefore urgently needs a peacekeeping force with a mandate to protect civilians from attack. However, since it is unlikely that the international community will be willing to maintain a sizable contingent in the region for an infinite amount of time, it is essential that those responsible for the violence be disarmed and disbanded as part of a lasting peace process. Moreover, forces are required immediately within Chad and Central African Republic (CAR) in order to contain the conflict and to provide space for regional peace. In CAR this would require a ceasefire between the government and rebels, which could be monitored by the UN. In Chad the priority is to stop Khartoum-backed insurgents from destabilising the country, and to protect civilians and refugees from cross-border attacks by the *Janjaweed*.

Ideally, international peacekeepers would work in genuine partnership with the African Union. The AU is essential to give legitimacy to the intervention: hopefully its members will appreciate that the continent as a whole can only benefit from the resolution of the crisis. Politicians and diplomats in the West should be convinced of the fact that their long-term interests lie in supporting stability and development in the greater horn of Africa.

In reality, such enlightened self-interest is unlikely. The Government of Sudan has shrewdly played on fears that any international force would be sucked into a quagmire, or would attract Jihadists from across the world. While it is important not to underestimate the *Janjaweed*, who are financed and armed by the Sudanese Government, these militias lack the support of the majority of the Darfurian population, and there is no Darfurian equivalent of the 'Sunni Triangle.' Comparisons with Iraq are not relevant to Darfur, whatever Khartoum may have told Arab and Muslim nations. Nevertheless, intervention in Chad and CAR would be more straightforward than in Darfur, not least because both nations are keen for UN peacekeeping forces to shore up their governments.

The Central African Republic

The UN Security Council should make it a priority to mandate a force to protect the Central African Republic's notoriously porous borders. However, it would be unrealistic and dangerous to expect UN troops to fight their way into northern CAR. Instead, rebel groups in northern CAR should be involved in

the process of negotiating the deployment of a UN interposition force, in exchange for a UN brokered peace deal which would address the grievances of the citizens of CAR. The rebels seek a power-sharing agreement, and would logically welcome the intervention of the UN if it could deliver this aim.⁹³ The recent sending of a UNDPK evaluation mission to the border areas of CAR⁹⁴ is an encouraging first step and hope that the current multinational force of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and French military advisers already in CAR will assist with the evaluation. Following a negotiated ceasefire, a subsequent Chapter VI ceasefire-monitoring mission would be active until a comprehensive peace deal could be signed. In the event that a comprehensive peace deal requires the continued presence of UN troops, it is hoped the UN Security Council will have the foresight to agree.

Chad

It should be stressed that action must be taken to prevent the conflict spreading from Darfur into Chad along its 500-mile long, porous border. Either an AU force mandated under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, or a UN force mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and dominated by African nations, should be deployed. The force must immediately establish safe areas for internally displaced people and refugees in eastern Chad. A UN assessment mission should act quickly to establish the number and size of the safe-areas needed and the forces required to protect them.

Any force should be supported by one of the EU's newly established crisis management battle-groups that are scheduled to be ready for deployment in January 2007⁹⁵. This requires an official request from the AU and UN, which should be a formality, given that the government of Chad has requested assistance⁹⁶. An AU force should be capable of protecting refugee camps from cross-border *Janjaweed* attacks if it has the support of an EU battle-group which could be deployed at short notice should AU troops come under serious attack. Preferably, the EU force would be accompanied by helicopter transport for quick mobility and tactical air-support in order to discourage Sudanese aircraft from entering Chadian air-space, and to give peacekeeping troops a decisive advantage in the event of a major fire-fight.

In theory the EU's battle-groups will be deployed for a maximum of 120 days. However, should the AU/UN force need further combat support, European states should be asked to contribute through the EU or NATO. Hopefully, the presence of a well-armed and robustly mandated force would dissuade the *Janjaweed* from continuing its attacks against civilians. The UN should also not lose sight

of the need for negotiations to address the needs of the genuine Chadian rebels. The UN mandated force should, crucially, not fight the civil war on behalf of the government of Chad or engage in combat with Chadian rebels unless in defence of the safe-areas. In return for having UN mandated forces on its territory, the government of Chad should support the handover of responsibility for peacekeeping in CAR to the UN.

Darfur

An AU force for Darfur should be mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and it should be expanded to at least 17,000 troops. This would be preferable to a simple expansion of the AU force under an extended AMIS mandate for two reasons. Firstly, a UN mandate requires the Security Council to provide increased diplomatic backing and focus to the mission. Secondly, it makes the UN Security Council responsible for the safety of the AU troops in the event of escalating violence between the force and the *Janjaweed*. The continued political engagement of the UNSC is essential.

Regrettably Kofi Annan's proposed UN-AU hybrid force seems like it may in practice be a plan for UNSC disengagement from Darfur. It is vital to provide vastly improved support in terms of funding, military hardware (weapons, vehicles, etc.), logistical support and communications and reconnaissance equipment. The source of this support should be based on a wide coalition of interested parties including the UN, EU, US, NATO and the Arab League. In the past, African peacekeeping missions have been provided with loans of equipment from forward storage of French hardware in Djibouti⁹⁷. This would most likely be the quickest and easiest method of supply. The US military's rapid reaction force, also based in Djibouti, should also be utilised for support where possible.

The Darfur force must first be mandated to establish safe areas and humanitarian corridors within Darfur. These areas should be zones where internally displaced persons can live safely in camps, and they should be defended robustly. Crucially, the safe areas must not become hiding places for rebel groups, or their weapons. If this entails fencing them in, then so be it.

Humanitarian convoys should be accompanied by well-armed AU troops along pre-designated routes and should be defended with lethal force. Disarming combatants should begin immediately, but it might be more realistic to ensure the safe-areas and humanitarian corridors are properly defended first.

Persuading Khartoum's leaders and their economic allies

It has been said that there are only two ways to persuade the UN Security Council to mandate an intervention; by pressuring the host state to invite intervention, or to threaten to do it regardless of UNSC approval⁹⁸. The second option is unrealistic given the current climate, and is undesirable. This means Khartoum must be persuaded to accept a force with a sufficiently strong mandate (see above). To get to Khartoum, it might be necessary to go via Beijing. The failure of what economic pressure has been put on Khartoum by the West has been down to the fact that the Sudanese capital is booming with Chinese oil money.

Beijing knows that stable countries have stable markets, and stable markets buy more Chinese-made products and extract resources with greater efficiency. The conflict in Darfur could potentially destabilise the whole of Sudan and East African, which would be detrimental to China's diverse business interests in the region.

In addition, the Chinese government is increasingly striving to be seen as a global player and a friend of the West. Diplomats thus have an opportunity to demonstrate to the Chinese that their current position is morally untenable, borrowing from the lessons learned when Russia played a constructive role during the NATO-FYR-Kosovo conflict.

The Chinese could play a vital role in convincing Khartoum that its posturing has won it as many compromises as are likely, and that it should accept a Chapter VIII mandated AU force (accompanied by separate forces in Chad and CAR), which is, after all, an African regional solution to an African problem.

Troop contributions

It is essential that more of the AU's member states contribute troops if the AU is to expand its presence in Darfur and take on safe-areas in Chad. Several African armed forces have received significant training and investment for the development of peacekeeping capabilities, thanks to the UK, France and US (among others) since the mid-90s. More African states may be motivated to get involved in the event of increased support for missions in Darfur, CAR and Chad.

It will probably be easier to persuade European states to get involved in a Chapter VI observer force in CAR than for more robust tasks in Darfur. Several EU/EFTA armed forces have experience of African peacekeeping missions and should be targeted for contributions. Some effort will be needed to persuade the EU to commit one of its new battle-

groups to Chad. However, the EU will soon be handing over more responsibility for security in Bosnia to local security forces, so there is scope for taking on new missions⁹⁹.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the Implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Comprehensive Peace Agreement:

- The NCP must begin to implement the CPA in good faith and make partnership an attractive option to the SPLM. The SPLM must become a stronger and more effective partner.
- The UN, EU, AU and Arab League must embrace their role as guarantor of the CPA by adopting a more consistent and forceful attitude and by holding the parties to their respective commitments.

Darfur Peace Agreement:

- The Government of Sudan and Minawi's faction of the SLA must implement, without delay, the wealth- and power-sharing provisions of the DPA. In particular, they must establish the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority and ensure that the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation is an independent and inclusive process.
- The UN, EU, AU and Arab League must provide the political and financial backing that is needed for a successful Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.
- The UN, EU, AU and Arab League need to reconstitute a viable and inclusive peace process addressing the root causes of the conflict in Darfur. In order to do so they must allow effective dialogue with non-signatories; obtain significant compromises from the Government of Sudan; and ensure that the new agreement is implemented in a fair and timely manner.
- The UN and the EU must authorise the UN Panel of Experts to investigate the offshore accounts of the NCP and NCP-affiliated companies, allowing more comprehensive economic sanctions targeting the NCP's main source of revenue for carrying out its genocidal campaign in Darfur.
- The UN Security Council must ensure that targeted sanctions are applied against the four individuals named in Security Council Resolution 1672. The Security Council must also designate more individuals identified by the ICID and the UN Panel of Experts against whom financial and travel-related sanctions must be taken. Only sanctions aimed at the NCP's assets, and those

of its security agencies and fraudulent charities, will motivate Khartoum to put an end to genocide in Darfur.

- The EU and its Member States should encourage divestment from companies providing financial or other support to the Government of Sudan.

On the Security Situation in Darfur

- All parties to the conflict should immediately abide by the Ceasefire arrangements provided by DPA and the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement. In particular, the Government of Sudan must put an end to its military offensive in Darfur and show its commitment to a diplomatic, rather than a military solution to the crisis in Darfur.
- The Government of Sudan must abide by its obligation to disarm the *Janjaweed* militia under Security Council Resolution 1556 of July 2004. The UN, EU, AU and Arab League must enforce targeted sanctions against the Government of Sudan if it continues to refuse to carry out a comprehensive disarmament of the *Janjaweed*.
- The UN, EU, AU and Arab League should press the Government of Sudan to allow humanitarian organisations free and unfettered access to civilians in need throughout Darfur
- The UN Security Council must extend the measures taken under Security Council Resolution 1591 to include the recommendations of the UN Panel of Experts, namely: the establishment of a verification component to the arms embargo (end-use certification); the expansion of the arms embargo to the entire country; and the establishment of a no-fly zone over Darfur affecting all aircraft from the Government of Sudan and parties to the conflict in Darfur.

On Human Rights Violations and in Particular Gender-Based Violence and Rape in Darfur

General Recommendations:

- The Government of Sudan must undertake comprehensive legal reform in accordance with the CPA and the DPA. In particular:
 - An independent National Human Rights Commission must be created to provide oversight of and impartial advice to the Government of Sudan
 - The National Security Act must be adopted in order for the National

Intelligence and Security Services to undergo a radical legal and institutional reform. The Government of Sudan must immediately stop the military and security services from suppressing civil and political rights and perpetuating abuses with impunity.

- Government officials must refrain from harassing, arresting, or detaining individuals who bring abuses to the attention of the police, and freedom of speech must be ensured to those who wish to voice their opinion.
- The Government of Sudan must conduct impartial, timely and transparent investigations into attacks on villages in Darfur, particularly into attacks in the Buram locality in August 2006, and in the Jenel Moon area in October 2006. The perpetrators must be brought to justice and prosecuted without delay.
- The UN and the EU must provide all necessary assistance to the International Criminal Court to ensure that it investigates and prosecutes individuals at all levels for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur.

Gender-based violence:

- The Government of Sudan should acknowledge the extent of gender-based violence and rape in Darfur, and publicly commit itself to hold the perpetrators accountable.
- The UN, EU and AU must ensure that the peacekeeping force mandated to protect civilians has the expertise and capacity to protect women from violence, including through monitoring and investigating allegations of abuse.
- In view of continuing violence around IDP camps in Darfur, the UN, EU and the AU Member States must provide immediate assistance to the AMIS, allowing protection measures such as firewood patrols (aimed at reducing the risk of rape, beatings and abductions for women and girls when they move outside IDP camps and villages) to resume. The number of female AMIS police officers and translators must be immediately increased.
- The UN and humanitarian agencies working in Darfur must urgently provide comprehensive reproductive health and HIV services as an integral part of the response to sexual and gender-based violence. Culturally appropriate reporting systems must also be designed to ensure that women and girls report incidents of

sexual and gender-based violence and seek appropriate help.

- To demonstrate its commitment to human rights, the Government of Sudan should ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa

On the Regional Aspect of the Crisis

- The UN and other international actors must recognise the regional dimension of the conflict when considering solutions to the crisis. A long-term and thorough strategy is indeed required to ensure a lasting solution to the crisis in Darfur.
- The UN must take immediate action to address the situation both in Chad and the Central African Republic, or the conflict will escalate, becoming more difficult and expensive to solve. In particular, rebels in CAR must be prevented from securing the diamond-rich area.

On Options for Peacekeeping in Darfur

- The UN and EU must create a UN Chapter VIII mandate for an expanded AU force in Darfur. Such a mandate would have the effective protection of the civilian population in Darfur at its centre, and it would allow the peacekeeping troops to robustly defend safe-areas and humanitarian corridors.
- The UN, EU, AU, Arab League and NATO must provide without delay financial, military and logistical support so that AU peacekeepers can effectively carry out their mandate. In particular, AU troop contributing countries in Africa should immediately bring the force up to its authorised ceiling.
- The UN must broker a ceasefire in the Central African Republic, leading to the deployment of a UN monitoring force under a UN Chapter VI mandate.
- In Chad, the AU or African forces of the UN should establish safe-areas under a UN Chapter VII or VIII mandate. Furthermore, an EU crisis management battle-group must be deployed in Chad to provide additional support to safe-areas should they come under attack.

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GLOSSARY

AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan

AU: African Union

CAR: Central African Republic

Chapter VI: Chapter of the UN Charter which deals with the pacific resolution of disputes. It usually involves a process of negotiation, conciliation, or arbitration between the parties to a dispute

Chapter VII: Chapter of the UN Charter that provides for a UN military response to threats to international; peace and security

Chapter VIII: Chapter of the UN that allows the UN Security Council to utilise regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement, peace agreement signed in January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM , ending the two decade long war in southern Sudan.

DPA: Darfur Peace Agreement, peace agreement signed on May the 5th 2006 between the Government of Sudan and Minawi's faction of the Darfuri rebel group SLM.

ICID: International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur

JEM: Justice and Equality Movement

NCP: National Congress Party

NIF: National Islamic Front

NRF: National Redemption Front, a rebel group formed by elements of the JEM, the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance and Abdul Wahid's faction of the SLA.

SLA/M (AW): Abdul Wahid's faction of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement

SLA/M (M): Minni Minawi's faction of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement

SPLA/M: Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

APPENDIX

BBC Monitoring Service: Commentary by Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid entitled "Al-Bashir in the forefront" published by London-based newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat website on 8 October 2006

It seems that the Sudanese president has used up all the fronts that help him avert a clash in the battle of the south -and now in the Darfur crisis - and there is no escape from appearing as a decision-maker, an interlocutor, a defender, and perhaps as a fighter.

Contrary to the official statement and the presidential speeches, the fact is that the president does not object to the deployment of international forces or to ending the atrocities in Darfur but on his terms. One of his terms is that he wants to end the sanctions imposed upon him. He also wants to be given a freer hand, which is something that he has not enjoyed yet despite his acceptance and signing of the agreement to end the war in the south and the proclamation of reconciliation and partnership in power.

Al-Bashir wants a price before ending the tragedy of Darfur. Meanwhile, the international community headed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argues that he should not be rewarded as long as the tragedy in the western region has been going on for three years and the atrocious killings, rapes, looting, and displacement have not stopped.

Unfortunately -and like other Arab governments - the Sudanese president enjoys a collective Arab cover for major crimes that are being committed by militias that belong to his regime. The Arabs know that the issue of Darfur is real and that its woes are more than what is happening in Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon put together. They know that Khartoum's rejection of international forces on the pretext of sovereignty is a lie since it is the same government that accepted international forces in the south. Moreover, it can arouse the sympathy [of fellow Muslim Arabs] with false slogans as it did in the south since all the victims in Darfur are Muslims.

Thus, we see things moving clearly against the Al-Bashir government. It seems that the dangerous escalation that it is doing will end with a clash whose price will be all the government that has already lost most of its supporters -whether Islamists or party members or tribesmen -and that has become fragmented from the inside into opposing teams.

It is now obvious to everyone that the Sudanese regime has been thriving on crises since it came to power in 1989. Since that day to date, the

Sudanese people hardly emerge from a crisis when they are embroiled in another. They have lost their resources and millions of citizens have been displaced. The country is suffering from an unprecedented crisis. The president is threatening the world that he will increase the disasters. He thinks that the world will remain silent despite the ugliness of what is transpiring in Darfur. However, he does not know that the most tolerant countries no longer object to ending the tragedy in any way, including military means. Then the daring speeches and the verbal challenges will not do him any good. These days, a large number of Sudanese that represent a big majority agree that the regime has used up its energies and that it is time for it to go either for the sake of Darfur or for the sake of Khartoum.

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